ABSTRACT: This paper uses empirical evidence from four decades of congressional elections to examine how redistricting institutions influence congressional seat competition under changing partisan tides. In particular, the paper finds that partisan gerrymanders induce greater competitiveness as national tides increases, largely due to unanticipated consequences of waves adverse to the map-drawing party. These results explain the "pseudo-paradox" that less competition in the national congressional popular vote historically predicts greater competition in individual local races. In contrast, bipartisan maps are shown to induce lower competition, and nonpartisan maps higher competition, under all electoral conditions and competitiveness measures.
paradoxical inverse relationship between national and district competition, where greater parity between parties at the national level correlates with reduced competition at the local level in congressional campaigns. While the electoral effects of bipartisan gerrymanders and nonpartisan commission maps tend to be resilient to tides (with nonpartisan maps generating consistently more close races than bipartisan ones), partisan maps suppress competition when the national electoral environment is closely balanced, but incite it when one party wins a substantial national majority, largely due to members of the map-drawing party facing unexpectedly close races.
The argument of the paper proceeds as follows. First, in accordance with conventional wisdom and past research, we show that both bipartisan and partisan-controlled legislatures draw fewer competitive districts than nonpartisan commissions. However, we next show that a previously unacknowledged factor, national tides, strongly and negatively correlates with competitive elections. Finally, we demonstrate how this interaction of national and district-level competitiveness is explained by focusing on partisan gerrymanders. Specifically, partisan gerrymanders increase close elections during wave cycles because of unanticipated competition in states with maps drawn by a party suffering through adverse tides. This argument is advanced through an analysis of various measures of competition in a data set encompassing the past forty years of congressional elections.
Previous Research on Districting and Competition
Declining competition in U.S. congressional elections has worried scholars since David Mayhew's seminal article "The Case of the Vanishing Marginals" (1974). Mayhew does not arrive at an explanation for the paucity of close elections and districts that he observes, but the role of redistricting in fostering or suppressing such competition has been controversial throughout subsequent work. Tufte (1973) argues that redistricting was the cause for a reduction in marginal seats during the 1960's. However, later studies concluded that redistricting, whether partisan or bipartisan, has had little effect on the competitiveness of seats or the advantages of incumbency (Glazer et al. 1987 , Ferejohn 1977 . Moreover, Gelman and King (1994) find that temporally proximate redistricting, both partisan and bipartisan, leads to an increase in electoral responsiveness in state elections, measured by the slope of the seats/votes curve. And Gopoian and West (1984) suggest that many partisan maps in the 1980's appear to have reduced the security of their incumbents, from an analysis of vote margins in two electoral cycles.
Scholars took up this topic in perhaps the greatest force in the mid-2000's, when competitive elections were are their lowest ebb. Most commonly, research points to bipartisan legislative agreements as reducing competition and nonpartisan commissions as encouraging it. Carson and Crespin (2004) find evidence that courts and commissions increase competition in years immediately following redistricting (using data from 1992 and 2002). Lindgren and Southwell (2013) also argue that independent commissions did reduce average margin of victory in U.S. house elections from [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] . But neither of these articles distinguishes between bipartisan and partisan legislative maps. More generally, Cain et al. (2005) find that an overall decline in competitive elections has tracked with an increase in the number of districts drawn by bipartisan agreement.
Yet other recent works claim much less of a role for districting in contributing to this trend. In an examination of state legislative elections in 2000 to 2008 (and using the same definition of competitive elections as this paper), Masket et al. (2012) find little impact of redistricting institutions on the likelihood of a close election. And Abramowitz et al. (2006) find that while much of the decline in competition since the 1970's can be attributed to the increased partisan polarization of districts, this is explained much more by population sorting than intentional districting.
And the specific role of partisan districting is inducing or suppressing competition is perhaps even more ambiguous. Hirsch (2003) focuses on Republican-drawn maps as causing historically low competiveness in the 2002 elections. But employing data from the same election cycle, Yoshinaka and Murphy (2011) find that partisan maps increase competition specifically in years immediately following redistricting, but constrain their explanation to the deliberately increased difficulty that out-party members face, rather than unanticipated close races faced by in-party members in the face of unexpected waves.
Yet the fact that partisan gerrymanders do not always turn out as planned for the controlling party has not gone unnoticed by scholars. Grofman and Brunell (2005) , in a series of short case studies referred to as "dummymanders", show that many maps drawn by Southern Democrats in the 1990's failed to anticipate trends favoring the Republican party. Conversely, Seabrook (2010) argues that the effects of Republican partisan maps were largely washed out by mid-decade partisan trends in the 2000's. However, the larger effect of "dummymanders" on competition, and the frequency of the their occurrence, is largely yet unexamined beyond anecdotal evidence and narrow case studies.
Why Partisan Gerrymanders?
It is easy to see why scholars have focused on contrasting bipartisan and nonpartisan maps in their study of gerrymandering and competition; the incentives and constraints of these institutions make it obvious what the hypothesized effect on competition should be. In the case of commissions, it is sometimes true that the creation of balanced districts is a stated goal of nonpartisan actors: the Arizona Proposition creating that state's districting commission requires "competitive districts are to be favored" as long as they comply with other constitutional requirements (Adams 2005 , Kang 2004 ). In other cases, it is a side effect of other provisions: the Legislative Services Bureau responsible for districting in Iowa is not permitted to incorporate incumbency or voting data in creating their proposals. On the flip side, without the added incentive of maximizing one party's seats, the uniform desire to protect incumbents of both parties in the case of bipartisan maps leads in many cases to districts clearly drawn to be noncompetitive. But the expected effect of partisan maps on competition is less obvious; the desires of a party to maximize seats and simultaneously protect their own incumbents work at crosspurposes, and it is up to the individual map-maker to choose how much emphasis to place on each goal. Cain (1985) shows how partisan mapmakers "packed and cracked" opposing party members into a small number of safe districts, and this has become the standard strategy for partisan gerrymanders. Yet, a broad array of tactics are available within this strategy. If too many opposing districts are "cracked", mapmakers risk spreading their own party's voters too thin, leaving many of their own incumbents at risk if political tides shift slightly against them.
But if partisans fortify all their own districts safely enough to withstand an unlikely adverse wave, they fail to contest seats that could have been won under more typical electoral environments. Additionally, Niemi and Deegan (1978) demonstrate formally how neutrality and competitiveness may be at odds when the overall vote is not evenly split, even when a fair map is desired.
The range of "aggressiveness" (i.e. willingness to risk their own party's seats to maximize expected seats) that partisan mapmakers chose in the 2000's is also shown in Figure 1 below, which gives a visual representation of three Republican-controlled gerrymanders We immediately see the stark difference between the partisan maps and the bipartisan one. The three Republican maps have a clear slightly pro-Republican peak, accompanied by several extremely safe Democratic districts (usually majority African-American). In contrast, California has no districts in the middle of the graph (indicating districts that would be competitive at the presidential level), and a clear bimodal distribution of both strongly Republican and strongly Democratic districts. In this map, we would expect very few competitive elections unless tides in favor of one party or the other were almost historically extremely.
[ Figure 1 about here] But although each Republican map seems to have more districts on the positive (proRepublican) side of 0, the aggressiveness of each map, and thus their propensity to withstand changes in political climate, varies. In Pennsylvania, the bulk of congressional districts lie between D+2 and R+4; Republicans in Pennsylvania drew several swing districts that they were counting on factors like incumbency and continued close national elections to hold. Ohio, with its peak around R+2, was also very aggressive, but slightly less so than Pennsylvania. Florida, with a peak around R+5, is a more moderate gerrymander, with many districts reinforced from mild swings toward the Democratic party. The differences between these partisan maps help This paper hypothesizes that a typical strategy employed by partisan mapmakers, exemplified above, will be to draw seats that will be largely safe for their own incumbents under neutral electoral conditions (when the national popular vote is closely contested), but which will become increasingly competitive as national tides adverse to the gerrymandering party increase.
Thus, the overall effect of partisan gerrymanders on competition can only be considered in interaction with national competition.
Hypotheses
From past research on bipartisan and nonpartisan gerrymander, and anecdotal evidence on partisan maps and occasional resulting "dummymaders" we would expect to see the following interactions between national tides and redistricting institutions: 1
• We expect low competitiveness in districts drawn by bipartisan agreement regardless of electoral environment.
• We expect high competitiveness among districts drawn by nonpartisan commissions when the national electoral environment is close. As national tides increase, competitiveness in these districts may decline or stay steady.
2
• When the national electoral environment is close, we expect low competitiveness among districts drawn by legislatures controlled by one party. As national tides increase, we expect competitiveness to increase, particularly when tides run adverse to the gerrymandering party.
Measures & Controls
For the purpose of testing these predictions on competitiveness and partisan bias, we have assembled a data set of all congressional elections falling on a national election day from 1972 (following the first national round of post-Wesberry redistricting) through 2010. The process by which each state was redistricted at the start of the decade was coded as Democratic-controlled, Republican-controlled, bipartisan, nonpartisan commission, or court.
3 States with three or fewer congressional districts are designated as "small states" and not otherwise coded. It is less feasible to draw maps to serve partisan interests, or achieve other very particular goals, in states with very few districts, particularly those with only one. Therefore, these small states, will serve as controls against which to measure the effects of the regimes of interest. Maps drawn by courts serve as a separate control for which we provide no particular directional predictions.
4
This analysis attempts to isolate the effects of the redistricting institution and not the effects of the specific districts drawn. Therefore, any controls that might be endogenous to the actual districts have been deliberately omitted (with the exception of denoting open seats in one specification for illustrative purposes). This of course includes district-specific demographics and partisanship, but also candidate-specific data like campaign spending and incumbency.
Although all of these factors are of course important to the outcome of a congressional race, the controls that are included (statewide presidential vote, region and statewide demographics, and redistricting institution) are causally prior, and thus the exclusion of district-specific factors should not contaminate the coefficients testing the theory. 5 Errors are clustered by district interacted with decade to account for serial autocorrelation within districts.
To get a complete picture of the effects of redistricting on competition, we employ four measures of competitiveness: the competitiveness of (1) the state as a whole; (2) the congressional district's relative to the nation; (3) the national electorate in an individual election year; and (4) the individual congressional race in a specific year and district. [ Table 1 about here]
The Pseudoparadox of Competition
As discussed above, many of the recent claims about declining congressional competition, in both the media and the literature, occurred in the wake of an era of parity at the national level. Between 1996 and 2004, no party won a majority of the national popular vote in congressional elections, nor did any party win that popular vote by more than 5 points, or win more than 54% of congressional seats. This is actually something of a historical anomaly. Of the twenty election cycles from 1972 to 2010, one party failed to win by at least 5-points in the popular vote only seven times, included these five consecutive years. And during a time when the country appeared so evenly divided, it would be intuitive to expect that many individual races would also be close, but less than 11% of races during this era were decided by 10 points or less (our definition of Close Races).
But this era of parity was immediately followed by three consecutive "wave" elections from 2006 through 2010. And despite the national electorate clearly favoring one party in these three years, the number of race that were closely contested rose to 15%. Recently, it does not seem that close national competition has lead to greater competitiveness at the local level, and this phenomenon is born out looking further into the past; this trend extends back at least as long as the equal-population standard has been applied to congressional districts. Tides; as the national popular vote gets closer, the number of competitive races tends to decline.
[ Figure 2 about here]
As a more rigorous test, Table 2 Table 2 shows that the effect of National Tides on Close Races is still significant at p<.05 even when this cycles is excluded.
9
[ Table 2 about here]
Effects of Gerrymandering
So what explains this "pseudo-paradox" that less national competitiveness correlates with greater local competition in congressional races? Figure 3 below shows that, far from being a universal phenomenon, the pseudo-paradox appears limited only to states with partisan gerrymanders. When we isolate only the partisan maps, the negative effect of national competitiveness on local competitiveness is strengthened (and significant at p<.02). But the magnitude of National Tides has no effect on competitive elections under bipartisan maps, which follows if these maps drew districts safe enough for both parties to withstand strong tides in either direction. Moreover, the coefficient for the nonpartisan maps is in the opposite direction of partisan maps, although not significant due to the high variance from the small sample size; this would also follow if such maps tended to draw many "naturally" competitive districts.
[ Figure 3 about here]
Yet it is also possible that these observed differences are merely the result of the types of states that tend to adopt these varying institutions. I.e perhaps swing states tend to adopt nonpartisan regimes or extreme states adopt bipartisan regimes. So we also run a probit analysis of Close Race on National Tides and the various gerrymander dummies including the Statewide Competition control. We also assess the slope of the effect of tides by interacting National Tides with the gerrymander dummies. As before, the unit of analysis in the first four columns Table 3 below is individual congressional races from 1972-2010, clustered by year crossed with decade.
The last two columns employ OLS on units of statewide means as described in Footnote 5, with very similar results.
[ Table 3 about here]
The first specification does not include any controls for redistricting institutions. For the second and third specifications, the excluded category is the small states. The third specification includes a dummy variable for whether an election was an open seat; although this is potentially endogenous to the gerrymander, we include it merely to show that the results remain the same with its inclusion, and thus retirements do not explain the results with respect to other variables.
Open seats do drastically increase competition (34% of open seat races are close, compared to 11% of races including an incumbent), but do not wipe out the effects of national tides or the differences between redistricting regimes. Figure 4 below shows the probit coefficients for the redistricting variables interpreted for neutral state and national electoral conditions.
[ Figure 4 about here]
From the coefficients in all specifications, we see that bipartisan maps and partisan maps (from both parties) create fewer close elections than elections in small states (the excluded category), when controlling for state ideology and national tides. Conversely, nonpartisan commission maps create more competitive elections, with an effect size large enough to be significant despite the small sample size. From the figure, this analysis estimates that while only 8%-11% of elections will be close races under neutral electoral conditions under partisan and bipartisan maps, 21% of races will be close under nonpartisan commission maps.
Note that in all these specifications, the effect of National Tides is positive and significant. We can test how this effect varies under different gerrymanders in two ways. First, we can include interaction terms nested into the model run on the entire data set. This is shown in column 4 of Table 3 , which adds the interactions of each regime with tides. Consistent with Figure 3 , we see that the "pseudo-paradox" effect of tides is again largely explained by gerrymandering institutions. When applied to bipartisan and nonpartisan gerrymanders, the effect of National Tides is not significant, but it is still positive and significant when applied to Democratic and Republican-drawn maps.
10
As second way of analyzing this interacted effect would be to measure the effect of tides on the data subsetted by redistricting regime. Table 4 shows the slope coefficient for the National Tides variable when the probit from the first column of Table 3 is run only on subsets of districts drawn under a particular institution. Again, the results conform to our predictions. We see a large positive coefficient Republican partisan gerrymanders, (and a smaller, yet still significant, one for Democratic maps) suggesting that partisans draw maps to protect their own seats assuming a neutral environment, but suffer a backlash when tides go against them, leading to many close races as national tides increase. In contrast, bipartisan gerrymanders, with safe districts are drawn so as to be resilient to partisan tides, show no significant effect of tides, while nonpartisan commissions show a negative but insignificant coefficient due to small sample size.
The difference between these coefficients for partisan and bipartisan maps is significant at p<.02.
In support of our hypotheses, competition at the district level increases as tides increase under partisan maps, but not bipartisan or nonpartisan maps, controlling for statewide partisanship.
[ Table 4 about here]
Differences by Party
The results above suggests that partisan maps induce greater competition as national waves increase, but the tell us nothing about the direction of that wave. Yet we hypothesize that we should only observe greater competition under waves adverse to the map drawing party (i.e.
Republican maps under Democratic waves such as 1974 and 2008, and Democratic maps under
Republican waves like 1994). And specifically, we would hypothesize that the slope of the National Tides coefficient for the subset of Democratic-drawn maps would be greater when
Republicans with the national popular vote than when Democrats win (and conversely for Republican maps). ; the difference in responsiveness by wave direction for Republican maps is not significant.
[ Table 5 about here]
[ Table 6 about here]
Although the sample size of elections, particularly Republican-wave elections, limits our ability to demonstrate the different responses to waves under Democratic and Republican regimes in a statistically robust way, we can at least observe these differences anecdotally. Table   6 Gerrymandering has historically worked very for the controlling party when the national vote was evenly split, but led to greater and often unexpected competitiveness as the national margin increased. There is no reason to expect these same trends will not continue in the foreseeable future. Notes: Entries represent the estimated probability of a race being won by less than 10% under various redistricting institutions, taken from model 2 in Table 3 , if Statewide Competition and National Tides are set to 0. Error bars represent the 95% confidence interval of the probit coefficient. Table 3 , run under a subset of the data for each redistricting institution. * = p<.10, ** = p<.05, *** = p<.01 Table 3 , run under a subset of the data for each Democratic gerrymanders. * = p<.10, ** = p<.05, *** = p<.01 where a map is chosen by a court from among those proposed by the political parties. In such cases, the congressional districts in this state are designated as being drawn both by a court and by the party of the map chosen. 5 Because controls are statewide measures, the data set essentially describes the proportion of a state elections that are close, weighted by the size of the delegation. An alternative specification would be to make each of these proportions a data point, weight them by delegation size (so that the impact of each individual election was still the same), and cluster by state interacted with decade (yielding 800 data points and 160 clusters). As the DV would now be a proportion (rather than a binary outcome), yet not properly described by a binomial distribution, it is more difficult to determine an appropriate specification for the data formatted in this manner. I have included such an analysis, where the proportion of close races is analyzed using OLS in Table 1 showing that swing states tend to draw more demographically competitive districts (as opposed to district that generate close election). 9 As an alternative to the Close Race dummy, this analysis can also be run with the overall vote margin as the dependent variable. Using this DV, the effect of National Tides is negative and significant at p<.05 when unopposed races are excluded, and significant at p<.10 when unopposed races are included and counted as a 100% vote margin. Full results available from author. 10 The interpretation is produced by adding the negative interacted coefficients for bipartisan and nonpartisan maps to the positive uninteracted coefficient, producing a nonsignificant effect.
When the nonsignificant interacted coefficients for partisan maps are added to the significant uninteracted coefficient, the sum remains significant and positive. 
